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Abstract 
Train is one of the mass transportation that famous in Indonesia, which continues to evolve and become a good choice for all 
class, including middle class and upper class. Train has special advantages which have high security, but it does not guarantee the 
least number of accidents. Seeing this fact, it is necessary to put more attention in finding a solution to prevent the accident by 
identifying the root causes of the accident using accident model. Swiss Cheese Model, one of the basic models of accident, acts 
as a framework for accident investigation. The train accident investigation would lead as a great example to have a better 
understanding of how the train accident could be happened. In recent years, the most common train accidents that occurred in 
Indonesia were slip incidents and train-to-train or train-to-another vehicle crashes. This research aims to implement the Swiss 
Cheese Model of train accident for developing countries. The developed country, in this case study was UK, that already 
implemented the model would be compared for the sustainability approach of the implementation in Indonesia. The result was 
showing that Swiss Cheese Model could be implemented in developing countries, especially in Indonesia. Based on this train 
accident, there are four factors that should be considered for understanding the accident: maintenance system, shift system, 
crossing system between rail and other road vehicles, and warning system. However, it was difficult to obtain the confidential 
and overall information regarding the train accident because of the readiness of the overall system to the accident model 
implementation.  The layers of Swiss Cheese Model should be determined to understand the overall system of train in Indonesia. 
The recommendation of this research was the basic accident model, such as Swiss Cheese Model should be entirely defined to 
portray the whole situation of train accident. Moreover, to improve the level of understanding, the model could be developed into 
the newer system such as Accimaps, STAMP or HFAC. 
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1. Introduction 
Train is one of the famous transport in Indonesia, which continues to grow and become a good choice for all 
classes. Although the train has the advantages of high security, but it does not guarantee the least number of 
accidents. In recent years, the train accident that is most common in Indonesia is slipping incident and collisions 
between train-to-train or train with other vehicle. In the period of 2004-2010 there were at least 700 extraordinary 
terrific incidents (PLH) in which 75% is slipping incident, 5% are collisions between trains, and the rest is a train 
collision with other vehicle at railroad crossings. In that time, PLH has taken 367 deaths, 654 serious injuries and 
607 minor injuries[1]. Meanwhile, according to the Indonesian National Committee of Transportation Safety 
(KNKT), the number of accidents that occur from year 2007 to 2011 reached 41 accidents as seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. Train accidents data in period of 2007 – 2011 (Source : KNKT[2]). 
Year Total of accidents 
Type of accidents Victim 
Collisions Slipping Other Death Injuries 
2007 14 2 11 1 9 31 
2008 8 3 4 1 7 24 
2009 8 4 3 1 6 38 
2010 10 2 8 0 42 47 
2011 1 1 0 0 5 10 
Total 41 12 26 3 69 150 
 
As seen as table 1, the largest number of accidents occurred in 2007 and 2010 with 14 and 10 accidents, but the 
victim in 2010 is more than 2007 with 42 deaths and 47 injured victims, while in 2007 the number of death is 9 
people and 31 injured victims. Looking at these facts, it is necessary to put more attention in finding a solution to 
prevent the accidents by identifying the root cause of the accident using accident model. 
Accident models provide a conceptualization of the characteristics of the accident, which typically show the 
relation between causes and effects. They explain why accidents occur, and are used as techniques for: risk 
assessment during system development, and post hoc accidents analysis to study the causes of the occurrence of an 
accident[3]. Swiss Cheese Model is one of the models for the investigation of a train accident. Some efforts can be 
deployed to reduce the number of accidents, such as analyzing the possible factors of accidents’ causes with the 
accident investigation. The investigation will provide information about how a train accident could occur. The Swiss 
Cheese Model was first introduced by Reason[4]. The basic foundation of the model was using productive system 
with five layers of Swiss cheese slice: Inadequate defenses, Unsafe acts, Psychological precursors of unsafe act, Line 
management deficiencies, and Fallible decisions (Organizational influence)[4]. The hazard (represented by the hole) 
that appears in each layer should be lined up to make adverse event.  
Developed countries, in this case study is the UK, which has implemented the model will be compared to the 
implementation of the sustainability approach in Indonesia. The expected result would be that the Swiss Cheese 
Model can be applied in developing countries, especially in Indonesia.  
The discussion has been developed over the years to really describe and understand about accident. There are six 
literature groups described in the Hollnagel[5] about accident. These varied from the perspective of the description, 
classes, complexity, in-depth, systematic, mechanism, role of organizations, and the analysis of accident. 
Meanwhile, Reason[6] provide different categories in two areas, individual accidents and organizational accidents. In 
addition, Khanzode[7] states that there four generations of accident theories: proneness, domino, injury epidemiology, 
and system theories. In addition, Leveson[8] strengthened that the circumstances of accident as a result from a chain 
or sequence of events need to be changed because of the rapid improvement of technology, failure mode of accident 
nature, improved understanding of hazard, limitation of single accident tolerance, increased system complexity and 
coupling, complicated structure of human and automation connection, and also the change of perspective of safety 
and regulation.  This research will be focusing on the first group of Hollnagel[5], organizational accident[6], and the 
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third generation of Khanzode[7]. Accident could be described as the unexpected event and or unwanted outcome that 
is caused by technological system failure and more than just a result from a chain or sequence of events. 
To prevent all accident is unattainable, but the efforts to minimize the accident from keep happening should be 
done. It could be started by understanding the basic concept and factual reason of accident and finding the proper 
solution[5]. In order to form investigation, analyze, keep succeeding accident, assess the risk and suitability, the 
usage of accident model is needed[8]. 
2. Theory 
2.1. Understanding train accident 
Train accidents can be defined as the occurrence of any event of a collision between a train, a collision between a 
train with other vehicles, trains overturned or slipped, floods / landslides, and train collision with human[9]. Based on 
these facts, train accident rate is an important parameter of railroad transportation safety and risk performance. 
Understanding the possible cause of accident rates is also important for evaluating the effectiveness of various 
accident prevention measure[10]. ADL[11] introduces the concept where a train accident causes can be divided into 
two groups: those related to the train length and those independent of train length. 
Anderson & Barkan[12] grouped accidents by track class which is used as a proxy for train speed. The accidents 
frequency and the average number of train derailment were examined for each group. They found that the likelihood 
of a train accident varies by track class. The effects of train length and the position of the train were also examined. 
Schafer[10] concluded that the position of the train on the rails affects its probability of derailment. They also found 
that the severity of the accident depends on the length of the train. Therefore, the probability of the train will be 
derailed can be caused by the length of the train, the train speed, and a certain position. 
A railway in Indonesia is managed by PT Kereta Api (Persero). Passarella et. al.[13] stated that with a fairly high 
number of users, PT. Kereta Api should improve the quality of its service and management to meet consumer rights 
under the Law no. 8 /1999 of Indonesia. It needs to be accommodated to fulfill the Minimum Service Standards 
(MSS) of trains. One of the Minimum Service Standards (MSS) is about the passengers’ right of comfort, security 
and safety[14]. The MSS needs to be setup and regenerated since frequent accidents involved a high number of 
human victims. Based on these facts it was concluded that the quality of the rail service in Indonesia has a suffered 
serious setback[13]. 
2.2. Swiss Cheese Model 
Perneger[15] stated that James Reason proposed the image of “Swiss Cheese” to explain the occurrence of system 
failures[4,6,16,17,18]. The Swiss Cheese Model is frequently referred to and widely accepted by safety professionals[15].  
Swiss Cheese Model was first introduced by Reason[4]. The basic foundation of the model was using productive 
system with five layers of Swiss cheese slice: Inadequate defenses, Unsafe acts, Psychological precursors of unsafe 
act, Line management deficiencies, and Fallible decisions (Organizational influence)[4]. The hazard (represented by 
the hole) that appears in each layer should be lined up to make adverse event. The improvement of this model is 
made by Reason[6] to illustrate that the holes will always be moved, changing in shape and size as a reaction of the 
acts from operator and local demands. In order to overcome the faults or hazard, there should be build defenses in 
the most possible way. Both the individual and organizational accident should be minimized using defenses that 
preventing the active failures and latent conditions[6]. 
The Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) can be used to serve three different purposes. These are discussed in the 
following: 
 
x SCM as a Conceptual Framework 
The SCM as a conceptual framework conveys that no failure, human or technical, is sufficient to cause an 
accident. It involves the often unforeseeable conjunction of several contributing factors arising from the 
different levels of system. It also shows what defines organizational accident. Some of these include the 
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concurrent failure of several defenses, facilitated, and in some way prepared, by sub-optimal features of the 
organization design. 
x SCM as a Means of Communication 
The SCM also can be used as a framework for accidents investigation. Reason[19] stated that according to 
Shappel & Wiegmann[20], HFACS is one of the most widely used of these derivative techniques. It is derived 
largely from though the layers have been modified. 
x SCM as a Basis for Analysis 
The SCM has also been the repeated assessment of a limited set of ‘vital signs’ that collectively give some 
indication of the current state of ‘safety health’ and what factors need repetition. The current version of the 
Swiss Cheese Model (as seen in Figure 1 that was published in 2000), appears to be a simplification of the 
previous model[15]. 
3. Methods 
3.1. Design of study 
The stages of the study start from determining the concept of study which would be used as a reference. After the 
concept has been decided, the type of accident should be determined to constrict the direction of the research. To 
analyse the type of accidents that have been determined, the next step is determining the method that is used as a 
research tool. The research tool will be used in this study is Swiss Cheese Model. The material of this tool is 
productive system with five layers of Swiss cheese slice: Inadequate defences, unsafe acts, psychological precursors 
of unsafe act, line management deficiencies, and fallible decisions (organizational influence). Accident investigation 
is done by implementing Swiss Cheese Model. The result of the implementation of Swiss Cheese Model will be 
analysed and assessed. The analysis result will be analysed as a whole and then we will see which part is in need of 
preventive improvement. 
3.2. Research flow 
Analysis of the train accident causes will be used to evaluate and find a solution to prevent the accident. This 
analysis begins with identifying the cause of most accidents and factors that may influence it. Analyses were 
performed based on five layers of Swiss Cheese Model and then the result of this model will be re-analyzed to find 
solutions and recommendations for the improvements of the current accidents handling. 
According to the study design, there are four stages of research. The first stage relates to the formulation of the 
problem. The second stage of the research related to the design concept. The third stage relates to the 
implementation of the research study. The fourth stage related to the processing, analysis and conclusions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Swiss Cheese Model by James Reason published in 2000. 
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4. Results and discussion 
Train which is one of the favorite transportation Indonesia, although it has the advantages of high security, it does 
not guarantee the least number of accidents. Many cases of train accidents that occurred in Indonesia are slip 
accidents. However, according to the data of the KNKT[2], the case of collision has more dead victims. Therefore 
this study focused on the case of a collision between trains to minimize the risk of similar accidents. One case of a 
train collision accident that claimed pretty much dead victim is a case of collision between trains in 2010 with 35 
people died, 29 people were seriously injured, and 5 people were slightly injured. To determine the root cause of the 
occurrence of this accident analysis is carried out using the Swiss Cheese Model as follows. 
4.1. Chronologic of analyzed case 
On October 2, 2010 at 19:30 pm, KA Senja Utama majors Pasarsenen Jakarta - Semarang Tawang (KA 116) 
departed from St. Pasar Senen. The trip to St. Pemalang took place safely without interruption, but the addition of 
delays along the way. At 2:21 pm, the KA 116 arrived in St. Pemalang and sent back to St. Petarukan at 2:23 pm. At 
2:32 pm, the KA 116 was supposed to go straight, stop on Line III of St. Petarukan to cross the railway with KA 
Argobromo Anggrek majors Surabaya Pasarturi - Jakarta Gambir (KA 3). KA 3 was planned to run straight through 
line II of St. Petarukan at 2:33 pm. 
At 2:44 pm, train dispatcher of St. Petarukan reported to train supervisors (PK) of Semarang that KA Argobromo 
Anggrek majors Jakarta Gambir - Surabaya Pasarturi (KA 4) violated the incoming red signal which meant KA must 
stop. PK attempted to contact the machinist of KA 4 via locomotive radio to be careful, but did not get a response 
from the machinist of KA 4. At that time KA 4 was traveling at 52 km / h. 2:45 pm. At 2:45 pm, the KA 4 entered 
Line III of St. Petarukan and crashed into the back of the KA 116. 
4.2. Swiss Cheese Model 
The basic foundation of the model was using productive system with five layers of Swiss cheese slice: inadequate 
defenses, unsafe acts, psychological precursors of unsafe act, line management deficiencies, and fallible decisions 
(Organizational influence)[3]. Factors that may influence the occurrence of accidents traced and grouped according to 
the five layers of Swiss Cheese Model. For this train accident collision case, the Swiss Cheese Model can be seen at 
Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Swiss Cheese Model of the Train Collision Case. 
3105 Muhammad Ragil Suryoputro et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  3100 – 3106 
Legend: 
 
x Fallible decisions 
a. Authority of machinist and machinist assistant overlap. 
b. There are no clear rules regarding the regulatory requirements to become a train supervisor. 
c. The division of tasks of machinist and machinist assistant are unclear. 
d. Health department only works until 8 pm. 
e. Intensive schedule. 
x Line management deficiencies 
f. Less socialization of role between train supervisor and machinist. 
g. There are no more adequate safety devices. 
h. There is no medical examination for the train officers who work after 8 pm. 
i. Busy schedules with short breaks. 
x Psychological precursors of unsafe acts 
j. Communication is not well coordinated. 
k. Physical and mental fatigue. 
l. Feeling unwell. 
x Unsafe acts 
m. Communication between train supervisor and machinist were not informative 
n. Miss communication 
o. Machinist was asleep 
p. Machinist was in an unhealthy state 
x Inadequate defenses 
q. Automatic braking was not effective. 
r. Distance of the signal took a long time. 
s. The absence of train travel safety device of accidents due to signal violation. 
t. Signals and codes needed more obvious cue, not only visually but also voice. 
x Train collision occurred 
 
Based on the results of the accident investigation, several factors that may cause this train collision accident were 
obtained. These factors translated into Swiss Cheese Model and a straight line was drawn to connect one factor of 
each layer to obtain a final conclusion. From Fig.1 we can conclude that the causes of this collision accident start 
from fallible decisions which authority of machinist and machinist assistant was overlap. This result in difficulties to 
observe the tasks because of incompatibility with the job description and influential in line management deficiencies 
factor which is less socialization of role between train supervisor and machinist. With the lack of socialization, the 
established communication became not well coordinated and leads to unsafe acts where miscommunication occurred 
due to the less informative information from train supervisor. When the machinist realized that there was KA 116in 
stopped state on the same line, the use of a safety brake is done but it was not helping because it took about 75 
seconds to stop within 1 km. The distance between KA 116 and KA 4 was less than 600m. Therefore, the train was 
not stopped and the accident became unavoidable. The improvement could be made for this situation was the line 
communication between the train supervisor and the machinist. There should be an informative way of 
communication, for example the clear job description and role for reporting and feedback should be given. The 
second improvement could be made for the health condition checking by the health officer. The schedule and the 
person in charge should be managed well during day and night shift. The next improvement was the automatic 
system of signal and braking. Due to signal violation the train and the railway should be accommodated with 
automatic system to prevent accident occurred. The distance from the signal braking and the stopped limit should be 
prolonged. The results of this investigation can be used as a reference for the improvement of the management 
system and train services to avoid the occurrence of similar things. 
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5. Conclusion 
Based on the result of the study, it can be concluded that: 
 
x Overall problem identified while applying Swiss Cheese Model on the case study of train accident. The 
recommendation to overcome this problem is increasing surveillance of eligibility facilities and performs an 
operational technical assistance to the machinist and the onboard staff. 
x Swiss Cheese Model can be applied and developed in Indonesia to investigate and analyze the causal factor of the 
accident. 
x For further research, this basic research could be developed on the analysis of the specific application of Swiss 
Cheese Model to be fully customized and provide better service for the accident investigation, especially train 
accident. The systemic approach could also be used to identify and provide integration of the sources of the 
accident and the prevention should be made. 
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